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In January 1990 the Centre for Conflict Studies marked its tenth 
anniversary. This issue also marks the tenth anniversary of Conflict 
Quarterly. The Centre came into existence barely weeks after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and about two months after the seizure of the 
American embassy in Teheran. Those two events have been viewed since as 
benchmarks in recent global affairs associated with the revival of the Cold 
War and the growth of international, state-sponsored terrorism. Those issues 
have dominated much of the international diplomatic and scholarly discourse 
over the last ten years. Although neither the work of the Centre nor the 
publication of the Quarterly was driven by the headlines, both were 
influenced by them. In the months preceding Teheran and Afghanistan, as the 
Centre's mandate was being determined, it was decided that its work should 
focus on the new, still relatively undefined field of "low-intensity conflict." 
The events of 1979, and many of those subsequent to it appeared to fall 
within the boundaries of that field of study. It is hardly surprising, then, that 
the Centre's research and the Quarterly's articles reflected, to a greater or 
lesser extent, the concerns of the last decade. 
What follows is a review of the Centre and the Quarterly in their first 
ten years. It will explain what we tried to do, what we accomplished, what 
has changed, and where we may be heading. 
Research and Publishing 
In keeping with its academic status as a research institute of the 
University of New Brunswick, the Centre's principal activities during its first 
ten years were research and publishing. These were also the main sources of 
operating revenue. Centre staff, with the assistance of other scholars from 
UNB and elsewhere and of graduate research assistants, completed twelve 
research projects. Two more will be completed this year. The projects 
covered such subjects as low-intensity conflict, terrorism and responses to it, 
intelligence activities, special operations, the disarmament debate, insurgency 
and counter-insurgency, aspects of Canadian defence policy, and deception 
operations. Five of these studies were published as technical reports and one 
as a pamphlet. Two were published recently as books. The first, Armies in 
Low-Intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis (Brassey's, 1989), examines 
the experiences of five armies (U.S., French, British, Canadian and Israeli) in 
low-intensity conflict, and the processes by which they adapted to the new 
operational requirements. The second book, Deception Operations: Studies 
in the East-West Context (Brassey's, 1990) analyzes the use of various 
deception techniques during the Cold War, through 16 historical case studies. 
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The current Centre Director, Dr. Charters, published his own book, The 
British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47 (Macmillan, 
1989), which examines the failure of the British Army to adjust its doctrine 
and operations to deal with the Zionist insurgent campaign during the latter 
years of the Palestine Mandate. In addition, the Centre published Low-
Intensity Conflict and the Integrity of the Soviet Bloc, the proceedings of a 
workshop held in 1981 to assess Western options for dealing with the Soviet 
Union. The proceedings of the Centre's first annual conference, on the 
Russian experience of counter-insurgency, are being edited for publication as 
well. 
Many of the early projects were relatively short-term efforts — small 
projects involving work of a year's duration or less. More recently, project 
lead times have extended from three to five years, which allows more time for 
thorough research. At the same time, in contrast to the early years, when 
much of the work was done "in-house", the Centre has sought outside 
expertise for the more recent and current projects, with the Centre staff 
serving largely as project managers and editors. Contract research for 
government dominated the first five years, while foundation-sponsored 
projects were predominant in the second half of the decade. 
The aforementioned books and other projects notwithstanding, the 
Centre's flagship endeavor is this journal, Conflict Quarterly. Very early in 
the planning for the Centre the principals agreed that it should publish a 
quarterly analysis of current international affairs. With this in mind, the 
Quarterly was launched in the summer of 1980. In the nine years that 
followed, the journal has published 150 articles and 73 book reviews. The 
subjects covered in the articles were representative of both the growth of the 
field of study and the range of issues of international concern in the 1980s. 
Fully one-third of the articles dealt with low-intensity conflict in its broad and 
specific meanings and manifestations; Forty articles examined various aspects 
of terrorism and responses to it. The Middle East, easily the most contentious 
area in the 1980s, accounted for 24 articles, while Latin America and Africa 
were the subjects of 13 each. There were 20 articles on ideological conflict, 
more than half published in the first three volumes, during the "chilliest" 
period of the new Cold War. Intelligence was the focus of 17 articles, most of 
which were published in the last four years, reflecting the growth of 
intelligence as a field of study. Of course, as with low-intensity conflict 
itself, there is considerable overlap of these topics and articles. Low-intensity 
conflict does not respect international or jurisdictional boundaries, and the 
study of it strays across disciplinary and subject boundaries as well. Many of 
the articles dealt with more than one theme. This too, is reflected in the 
range of contributing authors. While Political Science and International 
Relations are the disciplines represented most heavily, contributions came 
also from History, Sociology, Criminology, regional specialists, and from 
the professions, such as law, diplomacy, journalism, and the military. And 
while most contributors were North American, others were from the U.K., 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East. 
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It is fair to say that the Quarterly took some time to define both its field 
and its approach to it. The first few issues were dominated by contributions 
by the principals of the Centre, who stated clearly at the outset their strongly-
held views on a number of issues and events. This gave the journal an 
obvious slant, and left it open to the legitimate criticism that it was not 
sufficiently balanced to be considered a "scholarly" journal emanating from a 
university. The editors recognized this, and made an honest, conscious effort 
to reshape the journal so that it would meet the high standards of balanced 
research and writing expected of an academic publication. The Editorial 
Advisory Board has been expanded to include leading scholars in a number of 
fields bearing on the study of low-intensity conflict. The Board is now truly 
international, inter-disciplinary, and scholarly. The editors are grateful for the 
active role they play in maintaining "quality control"; they and other outside 
specialists subject every article to a rigorous refereeing process, which 
eliminates manuscripts of doubtful quality. Detailed comments are sent to 
the authors of accepted articles, and copy editing is thorough. And, in contrast 
to those first few issues, apart from writing the introductory "In This Issue" 
and the occasional book review, today the editorial staff limits its 
contribution to editing and management. By these means we have tried to 
ensure that the Quarterly is a publication worthy of the term scholarly. The 
regular flow of unsolicited manuscripts of high quality by leading scholars 
suggests that the journal has achieved that status, but only you, the reader, 
can be the true judge of that. 
In this sense, current circulation figures are most gratifying, although 
like many scholarly journals they are still small. Circulation has grown from 
about 150 subscribers in the first year to more than 425 at present. While 
this might appear unimpressive at first glance, it is in fact a remarkable 
achievement for an unknown publication with (until recently) very limited 
financial resources, especially for advertising, at a time when there is stiff 
competition for a declining pool of periodicals purchased by libraries. 
Libraries currently account for about 25% of the Quarterly's circulation. 
Since libraries provide a significant, if immeasurable secondary readership, we 
are pleased that the Quarterly reaches most of the major university and public 
libraries in Canada, the United States and the U.K. The military colleges and 
schools in those countries are also subscribers. Canada and the U.S. together 
account for about 75% of the readership, the remainder residing in more than 
20 other countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific. 
Research Library and Public Information 
To meet its research needs and to support university teaching in the field 
the Centre created a Research Library and Archive specializing in low-
intensity conflict. The library contains some 2,000 volumes, covering such 
subjects as low-intensity conflict (from conceptual, theoretical, doctrinal and 
historical perspectives), war since 1945 (by regions), terrorism, intelligence, 
media and propaganda, and armed forces and defence policies. The terrorism 
and intelligence collections together comprise more than one-third of the 
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total. In addition, the Centre receives more than 50 periodicals. The unique 
feature of the Centre's collection is the file archive. It contains about 500 
active files, on the subjects identified above, plus 86 boxes of inactive files. 
The files contain thousands of items culled from newspapers, magazines, 
journals, studies and reports, government and other official documents, 
academic papers, and speeches. The terrorism files alone number 175 
(including 85 on individual groups) in the active category, plus 14 boxes in 
the inactive or "historical" category. While the archive is by no means 
exhaustive, it is nonetheless a very useful collection and a boon to research. 
The Centre recently moved into new quarters on campus, which allows 
us to serve the research community more efficiently. The library and archive 
are housed in two rooms, one of which also serves as a reading room, since 
the books and files do not circulate in the manner of a regular library. The 
collection is used extensively by students, but is also open to any academic or 
researcher working in the field, as well as to the media and interested members 
of the public. 
From the outset the Centre has maintained an active "outreach" 
programme to audiences outside the normal academic community. Centre 
staff have addressed parliamentary committees, the armed forces (in Canada 
and the United States), the intelligence community, police forces, service 
clubs, teachers, and professional associations. In 1982 the then Director, Dr. 
Tugwell, addressed the United Nations during the Special Session on 
Disarmament. Centre staff were also interviewed on more than 600 occasions 
by local, regional, national or international media, usually for background 
information and commentary on current issues and news events. In addition, 
the Centre has provided information in reply to hundreds of inquiries by mail 
and telephone. 
Contributions to the Field of Study 
The Centre did not invent the field of low-intensity conflict studies. But 
it was still in its infancy when the Centre was established, and the Centre can 
rightfully claim to have played a modest role in developing the field. Both 
the Quarterly and the Centre's research projects have provided outlets for 
leading scholars and specialists and those just beginning to make their names 
in this area of study. Through participation in academic organizations and 
conferences, Centre staff have helped to develop the international, 
interdisciplinary network of expertise which is vital to any field of study and 
which now exists for this one. 
In 1987 the Centre inaugurated its annual conference series. The object 
of this was to bring together academic and other specialists to discuss in a 
scholarly manner topics arising from the study of low-intensity conflict. The 
first three conferences focused on, respectively, the Russian experience of 
counter-insurgency, the media and modern warfare, and Northern Ireland. The 
next one (September 1990) will examine the state of the art in military 
history and how military organizations use it as a training and educational 
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tool. The proceedings of these conferences are being published, in whole or 
in part, in the Quarterly or as monographs. 
At this University, Centre staff have supervised and taught graduate and 
undergraduate students from various disciplines, and have assisted them in 
making use of the Centre's research facilities. Finally, we would like to think 
that the Quarterly and the Centre's other publications and research endeavors 
have contributed to the advancement of knowledge in the field. If, as a result 
of these efforts, the field is somewhat better defined than a decade ago, some 
useful insights have been gained, and a few people are more knowledgeable 
than before, then our contribution, however small, will have been appropriate 
and worthwhile. 
Administration 
The Centre was and remains a small operation. It started in 1980 with 
three full-time staff (two directors and a secretary) and one associated faculty 
member as a third director. All the work of the Centre was shared between 
these four, with the assistance of part-time and voluntary help from graduate 
students. In the first few years, the Director's time was very largely taken up 
with fund-raising and project management The Deputy Director supervised 
research and looked after the editorial aspects of the Quarterly. In addition to 
normal office duties, our Secretary also handled journal circulation. It was a 
heavy, but manageable workload for all concerned. 
In many respects, the current situation is much the same. There are three 
full-time staff (Director, Researcher, and Secretary), and one part-time graduate 
assistant. The division of responsibilities is also similar. The major change 
came in 1988 with the appointment of 8 faculty Associates. This not only 
integrated the Centre more fully into the University mainstream, but also 
expanded considerably the range of expertise at the Centre's disposal. The 
current Associates and their fields of study are: 
Professor Francis Coghlan (diplomatic history) 
Professor Colin Goff (criminology) 
Professor Emeritus Dominick Graham (military history) 
Professor Noel Iverson (military sociology) 
Professor Loraleigh Keashly (social psychology/conflict mediation 
and resolution) 
Professor Thomas Kuttnèr (law) 
Professor Marc Milner (military history) 
Professor Miron Rezun (Soviet politics) 
These new members of the Centre have already made valuable contributions 
to its work, through the new inter-disciplinary colloquium, refereeing 
manuscripts for the journal, and participation in the planning and running of 
the Centre's annual conference. They also provide the Director with an 
informal network of colleagues who can offer advice and serve as sounding 
boards for and sources of research ideas. 
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For administrative purposes and supervision the Director reports to the 
Dean of Graduate Studies and Research. The Dean is assisted in this regard by 
an Advisory Council made up of members of the University's faculty (and one 
from another university). The Council meets regularly to review the Centre's 
performance, its financial status, and any other related issues, in order to 
ensure that it is fulfilling its mandate, meeting its financial and other 
obligations, and maintaining the standards expected of an academic unit of the 
University. The Centre also undergoes periodic reviews by a special panel; 
the next one is due in 1991. 
In its first ten years, the Centre raised over $1,000,000. About 50% was 
project funding from grants, contracts, and fellowships. Another 22% was 
provided by the Department of National Defence in the form of a sustaining 
grant. Corporate and private donations accounted for another 17%. The 
remainder comprised endowment earnings, journal subscriptions and sales, 
lecture and consulting fees, and book royalties. Over and above this, the 
University contributed about $350,000 in direct subsidies to the Centre, as 
well as providing office space and services. Between 60 and 70% of the total 
was spent on salaries or reimbursement of sub-contracted researchers; the 
remainder was expended on the other operations of the Centre (library and 
archive, conferences, research, fund-raising and conference travel, office 
equipment and supplies, production of the Quarterly, telephone and postage 
charges). In its first few years, the Centre was assisted in its fund-raising 
ventures by a Development Board, without whose help the Centre might not 
have come into being. Once the Centre was assured of longer-term funding, 
the activities of the Board were phased out. 
While its size and funding do not place the Centre in the big league of 
"think tanks," it has carved out a distinct niche in academic research and has 
accomplished a great deal with limited resources. We are grateful to all who 
have supported the Centre's work through their time, research, writing and 
funding over the first decade, and hope that they feel their investment has 
produced an institute worthy of that support. 
The Way Ahead 
The waning months of the Centre's first decade were witness to events of 
momentous significance, which seem likely to re-shape Europe and the East-
West relationship in a fundamental way well beyond the turn of the century. 
The warming U.S.-Soviet relationship, the end of the Afghan war, 
breakthroughs in arms control, perestroika in the Soviet Union, and the 
liberation of Eastern Europe, embodied most graphically in the tearing down 
of the Berlin Wall, are the events which appear to herald a new era of global 
stability and peace. Yet, if the East-West struggle is entering a more benign 
phase, if not fading away altogether, it is vital to remember that much of the 
rest of the world is not at peace. The Middle East remains a complex, 
intractable crucible of conflict. Other wars, of varying character and intensity, 
plague parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America and even the Soviet borderlands. 
Political terrorism continues to be a problem for particular countries and 
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regions, and remains deadly and destabilizing in its international aspects. 
New problems, such as narcotics, have moved onto center stage as 
international security issues. 
All of the foregoing suggests that the study of low-intensity conflict 
remains as relevant today as it was in 1980. Some familiar problems seem 
likely to continue, while new ones emerge to challenge us. Thus, there is an 
ongoing role for the Centre in trying to make sense of these conflicts in their 
current and historical perspectives. We will endeavor to make the best use of 
the knowledge and experience gained in the first decade to study wisely the 
conflicts of the next. 
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Game Theory and Hostage-Taking Incidents: 
A Case Study of the Munich Olympic Games 
by 
Reuben Miller 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines closely a hostage-taking incident that marked a 
turning point in the war against international terrorism. After the attack on 
the Olympic camp in Munich in 1972, Western European governments began 
formulating policies and creating anti-terrorist units to combat international 
terrorism. While most analyses focus on the direct demands and outcomes — 
the start and end of specific terrorist events — this study examines the 
evolution of the attack initiated by the Black September Organization (BSO) 
at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. 
Although many hostage-taking situations share similar tactical features, 
each incident is unique with dynamics of its own. The Munich incident was 
the first experience for the BSO in the international arena. The lessons 
learned in this case were applied later in Bangkok, Khartoum, and elsewhere. 
Both terrorists and governments learn from past experience and incorporate 
their observations into other incidents. Hence, we can see a progressive 
evolution not only within each event of hostage-taking but also from case to 
case. 
Hostage-taking situations are fluid. Each case differs in terms of 
numbers of actors, their goals and motivations, personalities of the 
perpetrators, and other variables which distinguish one event from another. 
Many of the different characteristics are often discovered through bargaining 
and negotiations. 
This article has several distinct parts. Initially, an outline of a hostage-
taking incident will be drawn, followed by a breakdown into three stages 
which are common to such events. The second segment will detail the game 
theoretic framework that will guide the analysis of the Munich Olympic 
incident. The third part will focus on the particulars of the Munich case and 
its evolution. Within this context attention will be given to the actors, their 
roles, positions, and policies. The next section of the Munich case will 
concentrate on the process of demands and negotiations. It will be followed 
by a discussion of the risks, costs and benefits for the terrorists and the 
government. The last section will analyze the German policy in September 
1972 and the complex decision-making encountered in this crisis. Finally, 
the findings will be highlighted. 
STAGES OF A HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT 
Usually kidnapping events have at least three stages: attack and hostage-
taking; demands and negotiations; and termination of incident. The two basic 
types of kidnapping are barricade/siege, and hideout. Table 1 shows the three 
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stages of kidnapping against the differences between barricade/siege and 
hideout. 
STAGE 
Table 1 
BARRICADE/SIEGE HIDEOUT 
ATTACK 
1 Hold hostages 
2 Location 
3 Under observation by 
authorities 
4 Access for terrorists 
5 Terrorists' food supply 
6 Incident's duration 
Usually 
Known 
Yes 
No 
Dependent 
Short (Usually) 
DEMANDS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
1 Communications 
2 Terrorists issue demands 
hold hostages 
initiate negotiations 
3 Government initiates 
negotiations 
TERMINATION 
1 Terrorists execute hostages 
release hostages 
surrender 
escape 
shoot-out 
shoot-out-escape 
2 Government resists 
assault 
comply 
Always 
Always 
Yes 
Can 
Can 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Usually 
Usually 
Sometimes 
Always 
Unknown 
No 
Yes 
Independent 
Long (Always) 
Sometimes 
Usually 
Yes 
Always 
Cannot 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Sometimes 
Sometimes 
Usually 
Attack and Hostage-Taking 
This is the most unpredictable stage and thus constitutes a crisis induced 
situation. The abductors have the initiative and the advantage of anonymity, 
surprise and control. Whether they are in a barricade/siege or hideout setting 
they issue the challenge to the host and target state, which must respond. 
There are logistical and physical distinctions between the two situations. 
In a barricade/siege the kidnappers and their victims are besieged in a familiar 
site known to the authorities. Thus, hostages and terrorists alike depend on 
the government's will to sustain the logistical needs of food, water, medical 
attention and electricity. A quasi-symbiotic relationship between abductors 
and hostages exists. Each is a guarantor for the other, while both depend on 
the authorities' willingness to replenish the besieged. A major distinction 
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between the two situations is that in a hideout the terrorists enjoy anonymity, 
relative security and mobility. They have free access devoid of the 
government's actions and policies. However, this condition will change if 
and when the hideout location is discovered by the authorities. Then, the 
hideout situation is transformed into a siege, as long as the terrorists and 
hostages remain at the same location. On the other hand, if the perpetrators 
and their victims escape before the authorities successfully besiege the site, 
then the condition of hideout continues. 
In a barricade/siege terrorists usually hold innocent victims. However, at 
times they have stormed a building or offices without holding any hostages. 
The place itself becomes "hostage." It can be a national monument, a 
symbolic site with some historical or other significance. Since the terrorists 
barricade themselves in the condition that follows is siege, surrounded by 
security forces and other characteristics mentioned in Table 1. Even then, 
with no hostages at hand, the authorities at times are compelled to follow the 
other stages listed in Table 1 because of the symbolic importance of the 
place. However, the authorities may choose to storm the building if no 
hostages are involved. Other methods can be employed by the authorities, 
such as cordoning off, or starving the terrorists out. Under those conditions 
the authorities do not have to follow the other stages, especially the Demands 
and Negotiations stage. By comparison, in a hideout, if there are no hostages, 
the authorities do not have to follow with the other stages. 
Demands and Negotiations 
Demands are issued, but the type of demands may vary in each incident. 
Placing demands marks the beginning of the first phase of negotiations. A 
common denominator that contributes to prolonged hostage-takings and 
kidnappings is the extended process of negotiations, which makes an incident 
more complex, especially in reaching a solution. The seizure of a Dutch train 
on 2 December 1975 by South Moluccan extremists illustrates such an event. 
At this stage: 
The hostage taker will begin his attempt at a coercive value 
exchange, and the target will respond. It will continue 
until one actor makes an irreversible decision on how to 
end the incident, either with or without the agreement of 
the other.1 
In a hideout situation negotiations are initiated by the terrorists as the 
kidnapping of Aldo Moro on 16 March 1978 illustrates. In a barricade/siege 
the government can initiate the bargaining without waiting for the 
terrorists to begin. 
In a barricade situation the terrorists always issue demands, even if they 
do not hold hostages. At times, the occupation of a public building, with no 
hostages, is symbolic enough from the terrorists' perspective. The 
perpetrators usually offer to release the occupants of the site in exchange for 
some demands. This condition is distinctively different from a hideout in 
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which the terrorists enjoy relative safety and do not have to issue demands to 
the authorities. 
Termination 
The last stage of a hostage-taking can end in different ways. At times the 
terrorists have executed the hostages whether it was a barricade/siege or a 
hideout. The execution of hostages could be a last resort from the terrorists' 
perspective. Since the perpetrators cannot see a desirable conclusion to the 
event or because they notice preparations for an assault, out of frustration 
they may take the lives of their hostages, and at times even commit suicide. 
The Savoy Hotel incident in Tel-Aviv on 5 March 1975 captures the essence 
of such behavior. On occasion Palestinian terrorists have killed American 
passengers on board hijacked planes. One famous incident occurred at Beirut 
Airport in June 1985. 
In a barricade/siege executions usually lead to a final assault by 
government forces. In a hideout executions could be a symbolic end to that 
particular crisis. Since the location of the hideout in most cases is unknown 
to the authorities, terrorists take advantage of their anonymity and escape. If 
their hideout is discovered, the terrorists have the option of surrendering 
with their prisoners or executing them. The kidnapping of James Cross on 5 
October 1970, ended in the first manner. Quebec Labor Minister Pierre 
LaPorte, who was kidnapped on 10 October 1970, was killed following an 
attempt to escape. At times, terrorists may choose to fight it out with the 
authorities. 
In other cases, hostages are released unharmed. In a barricade/siege the 
perpetrators usually give up when they release the hostages. After this they 
usually have no bargaining chips to offer authorities. In a hideout situation 
the hostages may be left behind, and the terrorists can escape without being 
tracked. 
A hostage-taking incident could be brought to a conclusion also by the 
authorities' initiative. A final assault by authorities may cause injuries 
among the hostages and their kidnappers in either a barricade/siege or 
hideout. A prime example was the Israeli raid on Entebbe on 4 July 1976. 
The final assault is always planned as a surprise attack in order to catch the 
terrorists off guard. This reduces the probability of the hostages being 
executed. However, in those crucial moments of the attack, a few seconds are 
enough for the terrorists to kill their hostages, as was the case in Munich and 
the attack on the Pan-Am flight in Karachi in September 1985. 
Finally, the duration of hostage-takings might be short — the Olympic 
games incident lasted just 15 hours — or long — as in the case of General 
Dozier, the American officer whose kidnapping in December 1981 lasted 42 
days. These stages are characteristic of all hostage-taking incidents. 
GAME THEORY 
When a terrorist incident occurs at least two actors are involved: the 
terrorists and the government. There could be more, with two or even more 
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governments becoming involved. However, the two player case is used in 
this game theory analysis. 
Game theory is "a body of thought dealing with rational decision 
strategies in situations of conflict and competition, where each participant 
or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses."2 In game theory the 
actors can choose their moves based upon their own preferences regarding the 
outcome, and on the basis of their knowledge of the choices available to their 
opponents. "The outcome depends on the choices that both of them make . . . 
There is no independently 'best' choice that one can make — it depends on 
what the other does."3 
Game theory has four basic assumptions: individual rationality,4 
transferable utility, weak order, and information. First, game theory 
assumes that the players are rational. When the players face two strategy 
choices they will choose respectively the one strategy that will ensure their 
most desired outcome from their own perspective. Second, the utility value 
applies equally to both actors. Third, the rational actors, in order to plan 
their moves, have to establish a ranking order of preferred outcomes from 
best to worst or ordinal order. Finally, each player knows the outcome of a 
particular strategy.5 
Critics of game theory argue that it is based on nonempirical data and on 
unreal assumptions of "rational" behavior and perfect information. They 
also claim that too few variables are included, and often those are not 
measurable. The harshest criticism of game theory is that it has no relevance 
to understanding the real political world. Despite these criticisms, this 
approach provides a useful analytical tool to penetrate the complexity of 
sensitive decision-making situations. It can be argued that people who enter 
into a conflictual relation such as a hostage-taking incident "think about the 
consequences of alternative actions they might take before choosing them."6 
In so doing one can assume that they also anticipate the other player's 
possible choices. Hence, the decisions which are made and the actions that are 
taken can be explained by using game theory.7 
In this "game" each actor — the terrorists and the government — 
operates to maximize benefits. Terrorists estimate what government 
responses their actions will generate. The government does the same thing. 
The two actors try to assess accurately what the other party will do and how 
it will respond. Of course, there is no way for either one to know for certain 
how the other will react. However, since this is a rational game, and both 
actors know the "rules," the costs, and the payoffs, it is possible to assess the 
final outcome. Certainly there is always room for misjudgment of the 
moves and acts of the opponent; game theory does not consider all 
motivations, will, or other human whims which may alter the logical 
process of the game. 
There are four possible outcomes to a terrorist event: 
A. the government complies with terrorists' demands, and no terrorist 
threat is carried out; 
16 
Conflict Quarterly 
B. the government counterattacks to resist the terrorists' demands, and 
no terrorist threat is carried out; 
C. either maliciously or accidentally the terrorist threat is carried out; 
and, as a result, the government complies with the terrorists' 
demands; 
D. The government resists the terrorists' demands and counterattacks; 
the terrorists carry out their threat. 
Each actor ranks differently the four possible outcomes. Hence, the 
terrorist prefers Outcome A as their first choice, Outcome C is better than 
Outcome D, while Outcome B is ranked as the least desirable outcome (i.e. 
A,C,D,B). On the other hand, the government's choice of outcomes is 
different. Outcome B is the most preferred. Outcome A is ranked better 
than Outcome D, while Outcome C is the worst possible choice (i.e. 
B,A,D,C).8 
According to the game plan the government has the first move after the 
initiation of the terrorist act and must choose from two broad strategies: to 
comply with or resist the demands of the terrorists.9 The terrorists will 
move only after they learn the government's move. They also have two 
strategies: either to carry out their threat or not. 
Since rationality is assumed in game theory the terrorists will behave 
rationally if the government does so, but the outcome will depend on the 
preference of the players. Ordinal rather than cardinal preferences have been 
specified with underlying values attached to various goals.10 If 4 is the best 
outcome value for a player; 3 is the next best outcome; 2 is the next worse 
outcome and 1 is the worst. So, in the case of the terrorist, Outcome A is 
valued at 4, C at 3, D at 2 and B at 1. 
Figure 1 
GOVERNMENT 
(Actor A) 
Comply Resist 
Threat is not 3 4 
Executed A B 
4 1 
TERRORISTS 
(Actor B) 1 2 
Threat is C D 
Executed 3 2 
(Government's preference is indicated on the upper right corner while the 
terrorists' preference is indicated on the lower left corner) 
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Figure 1 reflects the actors' strategies, the game plan and the possible 
outcomes. The only time where the game seems to be irrational is in 
situation C. In the other three situations it is possible to assess the costs and 
payoffs for either side. However, it is always possible for an actor to 
miscalculate or misjudge an opponent's moves because of a lack of 
communication and information. Moreover, by seeming to be irrational, one 
actor can gain an edge over an opponent." 
Ordinarily, without communications and with full knowledge of the 
terrorists' (Actor B) preferences, the government (Actor A) would realize that 
by playing "resist" it would gain the best outcome (4), and the terrorists the 
worst outcome (1). In choosing "comply," the government will reach the 
next best outcome and the terrorists the best outcome. However, since the 
terrorists realize that the government may resist and initiate Option B 
therefore it issues a threat: "If you try to resist we will execute the hostages 
(Outcome D); if you comply with our demands we will not execute them 
(Outcome A)." 
Outcome A is a situation in which the terrorists cannot increase the 
payoffs by changing their strategies while the government can — by adopting 
"resist" (Outcome B). Therefore, Outcome A is unstable. Outcome C would 
be the next best move for the terrorists if they suspect that the government 
will resist; they execute hostage(s) as a warning to the authorities. Outcome 
D is the next worst outcome for both players and their payoffs are undesirable 
to both. Ultimately, Outcome C serves as deterrent to the government, and is 
not altogether irrational from the terrorists' perspective. Irrationality comes 
into play when the authorities initially comply with the terrorists (Outcome 
A) who still carry out their threat without provocation (Outcome C). Of 
course the government will prefer Outcome A to Outcome C. What is at 
issue is the credibility of the terrorists' threat. Would they really execute their 
threat? 
The above situation is the simplest. However, in some incidents a 
bargain is struck in which the two actors each gain something through 
compromise. One of the better known cases is termed the Bangkok Solution 
after four members of Black September took over the Israeli Embassy in 
Thailand on 28 December 1972. In this case, after 18 hours of negotiations, 
the terrorists dropped their demands and released their hostages in return for 
safe passage out of the country. 
STAGE I — THE INCIDENT 
The XXth Olympic Games, which had opened in Munich on 26 August 
1972, were interrupted on 5 September when 11 Israeli athletes were murdered 
by Arab terrorists of the BSO. Five of the terrorists were subsequently shot 
dead by German police in a gun battle at Furstenfeldbruck airfield, some 20 
miles from Munich, while a German police official was also killed by the 
terrorists. The total death toll in Munich was thus 17 — 11 Israeli athletes, 5 
Arab terrorists and a German policeman.12 
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The Actors 
In this short but complex incident we can identify several actors: the 
terrorists, the West German government, the Israeli government, and the 
heads of several Arab states. '3 
The Black September Organization takes its name from the 
month in 1970 in which the Palestinian guerrillas formerly 
active in Jordan were crushed by the Jordanian Army after a 
bitter nine days' war. Pledged to the overthrow of King 
Hussein and his government, the BSO is also dedicated to 
the destruction of Israel and to the establishment of an Arab 
State in the whole of Palestine. It is strongly opposed to 
the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Arab States and 
Israel, since this would entail Arab recognition of the latter 
country.14 
This extremist group had also been responsible for the assassination of the 
Prime Minister of Jordan, Mr. Wasfi Tell, in Cairo in November 1971, for 
the attempted assassination of the Jordanian Ambassador in London a month 
later, and for the attempted hijacking of a Belgian airliner at Tel-Aviv in May 
1972.15 
At the initial stage, on the morning of 5 September there were two 
different levels representing the West German government: the regional 
Bavarian authorities and the Federal Government in Bonn. The local 
government was represented by Bruno Merk, the Bavarian Interior Minister, 
and Dr. Manfred Schreiber, the Munich Chief of Police. They arrived at the 
crisis center about 7:00 A.M., two hours after the initial attack.16 Later, 
Hans-Deitrich Genscher, the Federal Interior Minister, assumed overall 
command. Genscher also negotiated with the Israelis, using a special hot-line 
set up by the Bonn government between the Israeli consulate in Munich and 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem.17 By 3:00 P.M. Willy Brandt, the 
Federal Chancellor, had arrived at the crisis center to take personal charge of 
the negotiations with the terrorists.18 
The government's decision-making staff had increased since the early 
morning hours of the attack to include representatives of the Olympic 
Committee, the governments of Bavaria, Bonn, Israel, Tunisia, and the Arab 
states, and the Arab League. At this time the crisis staff included: Genscher, 
Merk, Schreiber, Ben-Horin (Israeli Ambassador to Bonn), Avery Brundage 
(the outgoing President of the International Olympic Committee), Bernhard 
Bayer (security specialist from Lower Saxony), Mahmoud Mestini (Tunisian 
Ambassador representing the Arab Ambassadors to Bonn), Mohammed Khatib 
(Arab League representative in Bonn) and Medgdy Gawhary (an Egyptian 
national living in Munich).19 However, the terrorists' demands were addressed 
to the Bonn government rather than to the regional authorities in Munich. 
Hence, this study considers the responding host government to be the Federal 
Government of West Germany. 
The Israeli government was represented by its ambassador to Bonn — 
Elyashiv Ben-Horin who communicated with Abba Eban, the Foreign 
Minister in Jerusalem. As in the case of West Germany, a decision-making 
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model of the Israeli government could have been studied in detail. However, 
for the purposes of this study, the Israeli government's position will be 
considered as a unified, cohesive unit. 
The German authorities attempted to use several Arab governments to 
mediate the release of the hostages. Brandt tried to contact the President of 
Egypt, Anwar Sadat, by telephone. He spoke to Aziz Sidki, the Egyptian 
Prime Minister, but his reply was disappointing.20 Egypt indicated that they 
would accept neither the terrorists nor the hostages. Brandt made another 
attempt at 8:50 P.M. to contact Dr. Sidki to seek Egyptian cooperation to 
safely conclude the Olympic hostage situation. In fact, Sidki explained, 
"This was not an Egyptian matter, and I do not know why Egypt should be 
mixed up in it."21 Hence, Egypt did not become involved. Ahmed Touni, 
head of the Egyptian Olympic Team, helped as a translator and negotiator at 
the Olympic Camp. 
In an earlier attempt, Brandt approached Kurt Waldheim, the UN 
Secretary General, to ask if he could arrange for Colonel Qadaffi of Libya to 
act as an intermediary. Qadaffi agreed and in turn notified Mohammed 
Dajhley, the Libyan Ambassador to Bonn.22 However, by the time Dajhley 
was able to contact the crisis center in Munich, he was told that the German 
government was "in the process of finding another solution."23 Hence, the 
Libyan connection also had no practical value. 
Another Arab actor was Tunisia. Mahmoud Mestiri, the Tunisian Am-
bassador to Bonn, also helped to negotiate with the terrorists. The terrorists 
had tried to call a number in Tunis, a man whose nom-de-guerre was 
Tallal.24 Information had come from Tunis that the number belonged to a ".. 
. highly placed personality."25 The identity of this man is not known, nor 
his role or function during this crisis. Therefore, this Tunisian connection did 
not influence the outcome of the incident because the terrorists did not find 
him. One could speculate that "Tallal" was a leading figure in the BSO. Thus, 
he was supposed to advise the terrorists on how to negotiate their way out of 
Munich in case they faced obstacles and difficulties. 
The victims, the Israeli Olympic team members, are not mentioned nor 
considered, since they did not play an active role in the negotiation process. 
Victims serve only as bargaining chips for the terrorists. 
In spite of all the contacts that they made, the West German government 
stood alone vis-a-vis the terrorists. The Egyptians refused to take part in or 
contribute to resolving the incident. The Libyan option was dropped when 
other directions were examined. The Israeli government trusted the German 
government to handle the situation: "We rely on the German authorities, in 
their contacts with the terrorists, doing all that is necessary to ensure the 
safety of the hostages."26 Thus, there were only two actors left even though 
the German government had attempted to engage other actors to help bring 
about a satisfactory solution. 
At the end of Stage I, after exploring serious avenues to elicit outside 
help, the German authorities were forced to plot their own strategy, identify 
available choices, and set an agenda for response. Thus, the "stage" for the 
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"game" was set, the rationale for the various moves was formed, and the 
government launched into playing a zero-sum game. 
STAGE D — DEMANDS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
The negotiations stage of the incident lasted roughly fifteen hours, from 
6:00 A.M. when the terrorists threw a note out of a window with their 
demands, until roughly 9:00 P.M., when the crisis staff decided to ambush 
the hostage-takers at Furstenfeldbruck Airfield. Table 2 indicates all phases of 
Stage II. Phase VIII marks the end of the second Stage. At that point the 
government provided a bus and two helicopters to transfer the hostages and 
their captors. From the moment of embarking on the bus at 10:00 P.M., 
Stage III of the incident started. 
Table 2 
STAGE II — NEGOTIATION PHASES 
TERRORISTS GOVERNMENT 
PHASE (D)emands/(R)esponse (R)esponse/(D)emand 
—A— —B— 
I (D) Demand release of: (R) Offer Ransom; if not Hostage 
a. 236 prisoners (from Israeli jails) exchange 
b. 5 prisoners (from German jails) (D) extend deadline from 9:00 A.M. 
c. Safe Passage + Aircraft 
Deadline set for 9:00 A.M. 
I 
m 
rv 
V 
VI 
vn 
vm 
(R) 
(R) 
(R) 
(D) 
(R) 
(R) 
(D) 
(R) 
(R) 
(D) 
Ransom rejected 
Hostage Exchange rejected 
Deadline extended TO 12:00 P.M. 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 2:00 P.M. 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 3:00 P.M. 
DEMAND FOOD 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 5:00 P.M. 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 6:30 P.M. 
DEMAND BUS + 2 
HELICOPTERS 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 9:00P.M. 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Deadline extended TO 10:00 P.M. 
DEMAND A BUS 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
(D) 
(D) 
(R) 
(D) 
(D) 
(R) 
(D) 
(D) 
(R) 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Food brought 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
Transportation guaranteed 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT] 
EXTEND DEADLINE 
Provide a minibus 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT| 
A bus granted 
2 helicopters granted 
[SAFE PASSAGE + AIRCRAFT) 
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The preceding table captures the various phases of the second Stage. The 
two columns represent the terrorists' initial demands (column A), followed by 
the government's response (column B). The transition from one phase to 
another is marked by the yielding response of the other party (i.e. Response -
R). Thus, we observe in each phase the continuous process of the 
negotiations through Demands (D) placed by terrorists, Responses (R) of 
government, and issuing of counter government demands with subsequent 
terrorist responses. It is noteworthy that each phase is marked by the 
extension of a deadline (in column A) followed by a German request to extend 
the deadline further (in column B).27 
At Phase I the terrorists issued their demands. The government responded 
with counter proposals and a demand. The terrorists rejected these proposals, 
but they did extend the deadline. Thus, Phase II started with the deadline 
extension. The authorities kept asking for deadline extensions during the 
entire crisis. At Phase IV the terrorists demanded food, and the government 
complied. In exchange for food the government again requested a deadline 
extension, which was granted. At Phase VI the terrorists demanded a bus and 
two helicopters to transport them and their hostages to an aircraft. The 
aircraft was to take the hostages and perpetrators to a destination of their 
choice in any Arab state except Jordan or Lebanon.28 The government 
guaranteed the transportation, an important development because the 
underlying demand of free passage and transportation was assumed to exist 
since Phase I. 
Initially, the terrorists demanded that the Israeli and German governments 
should release Palestinian prisoners. However, it is peculiar that those 
demands were not repeated by the terrorists during this ordeal. On the other 
hand, the German government offered monetary ransom of any amount instead 
of prisoners' release. Since the terrorists rejected the ransom, the government 
offered to exchange German officials for the Israeli hostages. With these two 
offers the German authorities' attempted to bargain down the terrorists' 
demands. 
The government did not reject outright the third demand of safe passage 
and did not try to bargain down the terrorists on this issue. As matter of fact, 
it had not responded in any manner to the demand of safe passage since the 
end of Phase I. Considering the German response, it could be argued that the 
German government lead the terrorists to believe that it had tried tacitly to 
arrange free passage for them, and thus it became a non-negotiable item. 
From the terrorists' perspective it is argued that, since the government 
had not mentioned nor negotiated safe conduct throughout the second Stage, 
they were led to assume that safe passage would follow and transportation 
would be provided. During this incident the terrorists acted as though this 
final stage of escape would materialize. This argument is sustained by the 
fact that they had not executed the hostages, had negotiated with the 
authorities, examined means of transportation to the airport, and called 
Tunisia for instructions. This evidence points to the conclusion that the 
terrorists planned to survive and to leave Germany. Also, it suggests that if 
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all else failed they still would be able to escape. The underlying assumption 
of tacit understanding pertaining to safe passage and transportation is captured 
in the Table above. 
The German authorities established a conciliatory atmosphere throughout 
the crisis by not rejecting outright any of the demands. On the other hand, the 
terrorists rejected vigorously the ransom and the hostage exchange proposals, 
proclaiming "Money means nothing to us; our lives mean nothing to us."29 
Thus, they indicated commitment to a predetermined course of action from 
which they could not deviate. 
On lesser significant issues such as food (Phase IV), bus and helicopters 
(Phase VI) the German government yielded. These demands did not carry 
political value because they were only logistical demands with no symbolic 
value and therefore could easily be met. The provision of helicopters could be 
interpreted as readiness, on the government's part, to let the terrorists leave. 
If that was the case then the German government appeared to be making a 
major concession. Another argument could be introduced suggesting that the 
authorities were setting a trap while trying to appear conciliatory to the 
terrorists' demands. From Phase VI onward the terrorists became extremely 
cautious, especially when transportation was guaranteed, and the authorities 
requested again an extension of the deadline. The terrorists were suspicious of 
the authorities' intentions to set them up, especially at the Olympic camp. 
Stage II concluded as a non-zero-sum game. The players communicated 
to each other directly and cooperated tacitly through inferred communication. 
It became clear that their mutual concern for the safety of the Israeli hostages 
dominated their rational behavior. The government understood and estimated 
that the hostages were relatively safe as long as the terrorists were not 
provoked. Hence, the actors were entrenched in Outcome A of the game for 
the duration of the Stage II. During this game, over a series of runs, the 
players had acquired an insight into the strategic thought processes of the 
other, and their ultimate objectives. Until 10:00 P.M. the government 
focused on the safety of the hostages and contended with a non-zero-sum 
game, which preserved Outcome A until that time. However, the 
circumstances changed at 10:10 P.M. when the terrorists and their Israeli 
hostages boarded a bus. At that time the authorities attempted twice to 
overcome the terrorists in the underground corridors of the building and during 
the transfer from the bus to the helicopters. It became clear that the terrorists 
planned to escape. At that point a transformation in German objectives took 
place. 
STAGE n i — TERMINATION 
The third Stage began when hostages and captors left the Olympic camp 
by bus to meet the awaiting helicopters, and concluded at a military airport 
rather than at Riem, the civilian airport near Munich. At 10:35 P.M. the 
first of the helicopters landed near the control tower, followed moments later 
by the second one. When the terrorists got to the airport, they acted 
cautiously, like they finally would be allowed to leave. Two terrorists 
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jumped out of the two helicopters and approached the Lufthansa 727 which 
was parked about 150 meters away. Two other terrorists got out of the 
helicopters and stood by. The two men discovered that they had been set up, 
with a plane without a crew, when they were about half-way back to the 
helicopters, police marksmen opened fire.30 Only then did the terrorists 
unleash their fire. In the shoot-out, 5 terrorists died, and 9 hostages were 
killed by a grenade thrown by one of the terrorists. A policeman also was 
killed, and one of the pilots was wounded.31 
The events at the airport confirm the earlier assumption. The terrorists 
actually operated under the assumption that at least one of their demands — 
safe passage and an airplane — would be fulfilled even though it ranked only 
third on their list. 
Throughout the crisis the West German government had been considering 
various options to bring about a desirable solution, including a military 
option. In the early afternoon police volunteers began moving into positions 
for an assault on the building.32 The West German authorities attempted to 
ambush the terrorists at the Olympic camp or on their way to the buses and 
helicopters. Since the route to the helicopters was not ideal for an ambush, 
the police were transferred swiftly to the airport. Thus, the ambush at the 
airport was organized in a quick and ill-conceived manner, which left no other 
option from a German point of view. Ironically, Bonn's official spokesman 
informed reporters at 11:30 P.M. that "all of the Israeli athletes are saved" and 
had been successfully rescued.33 
The last Stage of the game was marked by the instability of situation A 
and the transition to situation D. Ultimately, the incident was transformed 
into a game of chicken. The lack of communication, pressure to reach 
deadlines, and shifts in objectives created a prescription for disaster. Both 
scored 1, which was the worst possible score in terms of the original 
objectives — safe release of hostages on the one hand, and release of prisoners 
and free passage on the other. The game of chicken, when entered and played 
with human lives at stake, is played only by irrational actors. 
"GAME" RISKS, COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Since this was a barricade/siege situation, the terrorists' operational 
thinking was confined to a short duration. Since most of the terrorists were 
killed and the remaining wounded did not leave written testimonies, one can 
only surmise what they were thinking. From the terrorists' perspective, they 
may have assumed that the only risk which could have occurred was that their 
demand of the prisoners' release would not have been fulfilled. However, the 
terrorists operated throughout the crisis as if their other demand of safe 
passage had been granted. From their perspective the level of risk was 
minimal, and eventually the cost would have been low, too. Thus, situation 
A in the game theory was established. 
Throughout the incident the terrorists seem to have been operating as if 
the benefits were high. Even though they did not accomplish the release of 
their fellow prisoners in Israel and Germany, they still held 9 hostages, which 
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provided them with a bargaining chip and a ticket to freedom — or so they 
were led to believe, until the last minutes at the airport. With or without 
their comrades, they still possessed a strong bargaining chip — the lives of 9 
hostages. During negotiations they also scored intermediate gains of food, a 
bus, and helicopters. In addition, the terrorists gained tremendous publicity 
and media exposure. Furthermore, from the terrorists' perspective while in 
situation A of the game, they were acting rationally, assuming that the 
government also would act rationally by doing everything possible to 
safeguard the lives of the hostages. Therefore, with this assumption in mind, 
the terrorists' perspective led them to believe that the benefits outweighed the 
risks and costs. 
The German authorities were losing the game throughout the whole 
affair. First, the German government suffered a tremendous setback by the 
mere fact that this event had taken place on German soil. It was a blow to a 
security system designed to provide safety to foreign nationals, and to its 
international image and national pride during a highly visible event. 
Therefore, the government had to move to a better position, preferably 
situation B in the game. But here they fared no better. They failed in their 
efforts to engage other parties in helping to defuse the crisis; Germany sought 
help from Egypt, the UN and Libya. In addition, the government attempted 
to persuade Israel to release the prisoners in its jails. During those 
international consultations, the German authorities had been stalling for time 
at the Olympic camp. Probably the lack of cooperation or help contributed to 
the German sense of isolation and inability to do anything about resolving 
the issue. Finally, they counter-proposed a hostage exchange and ransom; 
those proposals were rejected outright. Thus, the attempts to move from 
situation A of compliance with demands were dissolving. Every move they 
made failed to produce success. 
Though they had not achieved the hostages' release, they actually had 
achieved a partial victory by not releasing the prisoners. For the Germans, 
however, this modest success offered little comfort, and they focused on the 
ultimate goal, the hostages' release. They committed themselves to this 
particular goal to such an extent that they lost sight of changing 
circumstances. The government wanted to force situation B. But when it 
failed to negotiate into situation B the government was still determined to 
release the hostages by all means — even if this meant resorting to military 
action. Having failed to provide good security in Stage I and not securing 
the safety of the hostages or their release in Stage II, the only option to 
reverse this chain of failures was to terminate the incident successfully. The 
determination to do so thus overshadowed the risks and costs of losing the 
whole "game." 
The Germans took numerous risks by not guaranteeing safe passage. 
Thus, the fiasco at the airport amounted to a greater loss which outweighed 
their success on the issue of prisoners release and a firm decision not to 
release these prisoners. The German government could have let the terrorists 
go with their hostages. This form of action would have scored 3 for the 
terrorists and also 3 for the government (next best option). The terrorists 
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would have scored 3 because they would have accomplished at least one 
demand, and been left with the hostages. The government would have scored 
3 for not releasing the prisoners, but at the same time succumbing to safe 
passage. Naturally, given the extreme frustration and widespread publicity, 
the German government was concerned with saving face. They began to 
focus on "getting the terrorists" rather than on the safety of the hostages. 
When the German government was unable to dictate the outcome, because of 
the terrorists' choices and determination, the authorities turned to an action 
which reflected these frustrations. The West German government acted in a 
less rational way by the game theory logic and moved to situation D of the 
crisis. 
On the other hand, a closer look at the German perspective could explain 
the reason for the shootings at the airport. Since the terrorists had killed two 
of the athletes during the initial attack, the Germans could reasonably assume 
that they would not hesitate to kill others. This perception of the terrorists 
was enhanced by their intentions and threats stated outright in Phase I. 
Against this background the German authorities may have considered the 
athletes dead as long as they were held by the BSO. Therefore, from a German 
point of view, anything attempted would have been a worthwhile risk to save 
the hostages. Also, Germany could have scored extra points for taking a firm, 
non-yielding approach. Hence, the risks and costs for the German government 
outweighed any other course of action such as providing free passage. Thus, 
from a German perspective, situation A, created at the incident's onset, 
became rather unstable. 
The West German action at the airport culminated in an act of frustration 
with no other choice of reaction. When the German police opened fire, the 
terrorists carried out their threat, bringing about situation D in the game. At 
that point the terrorists had no other choice but to kill the hostages. It could 
be argued that their resort to violence was derived from their inability to 
dictate the final stage of the incident. Realizing that their only hope for safe 
passage was breached, they executed a vengeful and malicious murder of the 
Israeli athletes. Another possible explanation is that the terrorists were under 
strict orders and were not to deviate from them. Such a conclusion is based 
on two other incidents that BSO carried out, in December 1972 and March 
1973 in Bangkok and Khartoum respectively. Hence, it could be argued that 
the scenario was preset and the terrorists followed it to the letter. 
Throughout the second Stage the government had gained tactical success. 
The Germans scored high by not yielding to two demands: prisoners' release 
and safe passage. Furthermore, the authorities successfully delayed and 
extended the deadline seven times. Thus, it could be argued that the West 
German government accomplished its goal with a harsh policy toward 
terrorism. However, in the final act 9 hostages were killed and Germany, as a 
host country, was responsible for their deaths. Furthermore, the government 
lost a German police officer, and two helicopters were destroyed. It lost face 
internationally as well as domestically because of the failure at the airport, 
bad publicity, and the loss of credibility in responding to inquiries pertaining 
to the outcome of events at the airport. 
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In terms of gains or benefits for the terrorists there were only three 
immediate and tactical gains of food, a bus, and helicopters. None of these 
gains had political value. Indirectly they won world attention and widespread 
publicity, providing them with limited tangible success. On the other hand, 
the losses were enormous. They did not accomplish their initial goal of 
freeing prisoners. They constantly gave way to the extensions of the 
deadline. Finally, 5 of the terrorists were killed while the other 3 were 
wounded and captured, which provided a reason for an additional terrorist 
attack on West Germany a month later. Moreover, there was considerable 
revulsion toward those who killed the hostages, which probably undermined 
any positive publicity the initial incident had gained. 
GERMAN POLICY 
Until the Olympic Games incident in 1972, the West German 
government had not experienced acts of international terrorism, only 
domestic terrorism. West German authorities were not prepared to deal with 
international events. Security for the Olympic Games was handled by the 
local Bavarian authorities, who treated it as a domestic matter. The 
government perceived that domestic and international terrorism were 
indistinguishable. The Munich incident generated a German policy and 
marked a turning point for Germany as well as for other democracies in 
responding to acts of international terrorism. After this incident security for 
such major events was dealt with at the national level. The Olympic Games 
in Montreal (1976), in Los Angeles (1984), and in Seoul (1988), experienced 
the most rigid and meticulous security preparations and measures. 
The lack of preparedness on the part of the West German government is 
reflected in a press conference given in Munich on 7 September 1972. Dr. 
Schreiber exclaimed that the " . . . Israeli hostages were virtually doomed from 
the outset, since they could have been saved only if their captors had made 
mistakes, which did not happen."34 Merk, when asked how he explained the 
apparent failure of the operation, replied: "All we could do was hope for a 
mistake. But these people are not amateurs."35 These two pronouncements 
demonstrate that West German authorities were ill-prepared to deal with an 
international incident of this magnitude. They were willing to take risks 
beyond the probable level of success. This fact also proves that the West 
German government was vulnerable to its critics and sensitive to its self-
image, which led to irrational thinking and affected its good judgement 
concerning the safety of the Israeli athletes. They ignored such important 
human traits as political motivation, a high degree of commitment, sacrificial 
intentions, and military skills. The West German authorities actually played 
down, in their handling of the situation at the airport, the intelligence and 
capabilities of the terrorists. For example, there were only 4 German 
sharpshooters at die airport while there were 8 terrorists. 
Stage II indicates that the German government did not have an anti-
terrorist policy. First, the authorities attempted to delegate responsibility to 
other major actors by involving Israel and Egypt, since they did not have any 
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particular guidelines to follow. If Israel and Egypt had actually complied, the 
government would not have had to make hard choices. But, without those 
options, the Germans were pushed to apply a hard line. Although they did 
not yield to the terrorists' demands, they negotiated with the terrorists for 
twelve hours, exercising a flexible response. 
On the local level, the Germans yielded to lesser demands of food, a bus, 
and helicopters. These tactical concessions were free of political value, but, it 
could be argued, that they were made as a means to disarm and pacify the 
terrorists, to exhaust them by long delays, and to gain time until a decision at 
the federal level could be reached, or help from abroad was received. The 
flexible response, constrained by international links, actually became a harsh 
policy of "no concessions", which failed to produce a desirable termination of 
the incident. Such international constraints helped the West German 
government to reassess and modify its response to future acts of international 
terrorism. This flexibility was demonstrated just one month later, when a 
Lufthansa plane was hijacked. This hijacking incident was meant to release 
the 3 terrorists captured during the Munich Olympic incident. The authorities 
yielded. In other words, the harsh practices of the Olympic Games did not 
result in a harsh policy generally. However, the German authorities did 
develop guidelines and police units, and a federally controlled unit (GSG-9) to 
fight terrorism. 
What can be learned about negotiations? Even though negotiations were 
held in Munich, they failed to produce a desirable result from the German 
government's perspective. The terrorists had a predetermined course of action, 
and set their goals accordingly. Perhaps the negotiation variable has little 
weight in the final outcome of the incident. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this article was to scrutinize a highly visible incident that 
unfolded in full view of the world. By Western standards all murders are 
abhorrent and this senseless massacre of 11 Israeli athletes on German soil by 
Palestinian terrorists is no different. 
Other works dealing with this event provided detailed descriptions. Some 
reports were by eye-witnesses. However, none was able to provide an insight 
into the choices and preferences of the actors. This study attempted to explore 
the evolution of these complex decisions on both sides. While all writers 
agree that the outcome was horrible, none explain the inner process by which 
mistakes were formulated and enacted. The most significant drawback among 
other works is the absence of the terrorists' perspective. By contrast, this 
article using game theory, which relies on some basic assumptions, has the 
power and depth to cast a new and different light on this instance. 
The Munich disaster has been studied as one continuous event. It has 
been analyzed as a progressive incident which experienced transitions from 
one stage to the other. By dividing this case into three distinct stages one can 
observe the evolution and transformation in the players' objectives, their 
alternative choices, and decisions, which ultimately led to the tragic end. 
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The Munich Olympic case is extremely complex. To understand tangled 
linkages intertwined with conflicting views and objectives one requires a 
scheme or paradigm, which ties things together in a logically structured 
manner. Hence, game theory was chosen for this purpose. However, game 
theory does not escape scrutiny and criticism. 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff36 argue that "The analysis of games will not 
furnish a normative code of how to behave in any concrete situation. Nor 
does it give us a complete empirical theory of how people actually do behave 
in real life situations." Nonetheless, they make a distinction between game 
theory and game playing.37 The former is a mathematical tool used to assess 
and analyze the maximizing utility strategy of the players. Therefore, as pure 
theory it stands beyond criticism. The latter permits us to see what choices 
the players actually have made. Studies involving the use of games criticize 
game playing on several grounds. Probably the strongest argument is that 
there is little resemblance between games and political reality. Other 
arguments point to the invalidity of generalizations which have been drawn 
from games.38 
Some critics may also argue that game theory is flawed because it is a 
deductive theory that assumes decisions are rational, consistent, and mutually 
serve the players' goals to maximize their payoffs. Furthermore, they argue 
that this theory is devoid of the human factor — emotional and ethical 
characteristics such as hate, love, motivation, political fervor, commitment, 
and determination. Therefore, it is impossible to assess and measure them as a 
driving force toward making a decision. Finally, critics argue that often the 
players do not play by the same rules or they have different scales of payoffs 
and values attached; therefore the game is bound to fail. 
Having considered these arguments, the analysis above points out that 
the failure of the German government to bring the incident to a desirable 
solution can be attributed to several factors. 
The West German Government Approached the Incident as a 
Zero-Sum Game 
Therefore, the authorities had to "win" the game at the last available 
opportunity (move), when the terrorists and their captives boarded the buses at 
the Olympic camp, and before they boarded the plane. Only in that segment 
of time could the authorities force a solution — or so they thought — after 
all efforts throughout Stage II had failed. The authorities then could not make 
any other offer or gesture to stall for time or induce a new direction of action 
from the terrorists. 
Since the terrorists were about to claim their safe passage, the objective 
of the authorities was to stop them from leaving at all costs. If they 
succeeded, then situation B in the game would have materialized. In other 
words, the government by using "resist" would overcome the terrorists who at 
that point did not execute their threats. Hence, the government would "win" 
and the terrorists would lose this last move. If the West German government 
had viewed it as a non-zero-sum then it could have let the terrorists leave with 
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the hostages. At least the hostages would be alive. Such responses have 
been practiced on some occasions since 1972, with some success. 
Breakdown of Communications and Failure of Negotiations 
With the provision of transportation to the terrorists and hostages, the 
game came to an end. As long as bargaining and negotiations took place, the 
actors behaved rationally, responded to each other in a procedural manner, and 
stability was maintained. Furthermore, throughout Stage II both players had a 
mutual interest — keeping the hostages alive. However, with the breakdown 
in communications, the common denominator which kept the mutual interest 
alive disappeared and was replaced by conflicting interests for both actors. In 
this last Stage of the incident both actors lacked communication and 
information about each other's strategy. Hence, both acted almost 
simultaneously in a fashion which created the tragic outcome. At the same 
time both lost and situation D in the game prevailed. 
Shift in Goals or Relative Weight of Priorities: 
Transformation in Objectives 
When the game came to an end at 10:00 P.M. on 5 September 1972, 
difficulties arose. Until then, the mutual interest was to spare the lives of the 
captives so long as other objectives were met. At this Stage, the terrorists' 
objective became safe passage for them and their hostages. At the same time, 
the objective of the authorities was to prevent safe passage. Hence, a 
transition took place from the prior objective to the safe passage issue. At 
this point in time little consideration was given to the hostages, who were 
regarded as dead if they remained in the hands of the terrorists. Therefore, the 
authorities were bound to force a solution that still retained the zero-sum 
game condition, and provided a slight chance of success. For a very brief 
period at the end of Stage II, the game shifted to Outcome B, where the 
authorities attempted to utilize military force, and the terrorists did not 
execute their threat. At the airport, however, once the police snipers opened 
fire, the terrorists were forced to react in what seemed to them to be the only 
available alternative. One could argue that the terrorists had another choice — 
to surrender. Eventually they did, but in the time that elapsed they did what 
they were trained to do — they fought back. Thus, both players lost. 
Mutual Constraints 
The terrorists had a predetermined course of action imposed by the BSO. 
They were under strict orders not to release the hostages without the release of 
imprisoned terrorists in Israel and Germany.39 With these specific guidelines, 
the terrorists had little voice in the decision-making and could not deviate 
from the original plan. Furthermore, their orders were to kill the hostages 
and fight to the end if fired upon. By adhering to these guidelines, the 
terrorists fought at the airport and murdered the Israeli athletes. 
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On the other hand, the German authorities also were limited in their 
response to the terrorists' demands to release prisoners. They could not force 
or persuade Israel to release its jailed terrorists. Also, the release of prisoners 
in German jails would have been only a partial fulfilment of the demands. 
Besides, the international nature of the incident at the Olympic camp 
interfered with policies pertaining to domestic terrorism. With these 
conditions at hand, the German authorities felt constrained to act. 
Both actors were oblivious to the other's constraints and were locked in a 
non-solvable situation from which neither could deviate. Hence, the German 
government, guided by a zero-sum game strategy, with no communication 
and information about the terrorists' strategy and lacking decision-making 
powers, tried and failed to force a solution at the airport. 
Lack of National Policy and Force 
The details of the incident indicate that relying on local authorities and 
forces was inappropriate given the importance and magnitude of this event. 
The local government did not have the powers to deal with such highly 
sensitive and complicated international situations. 
Several lessons have been learned by governments and terrorists in other 
incidents that followed. The most important lesson for governments was to 
maintain communication flow and to avoid transforming the objectives. The 
uppermost objective of many host governments dealing with an international 
terrorist incident since then has been to save the lives of the hostages. In that 
sense the Munich incident was an innovation, if not an original invention 
. . . that grew out of the airliner hijackings and political 
kidnappings of the late 1960s and very early 1970s. As 
hijackings declined from 1972 through 1975, the number of 
barricade and hostage incidents increased. The objectives 
remained the same, and the demands remained the same. 
The only thing different was the 'vessel' in which the 
hostages were held.40 
This observation by Brian Jenkins encapsulates the progression of the 
nature and tactics of terrorist acts. After all, we ought to bear in mind that 
the terrorists' goals might be to gain publicity rather than to execute 
hostages. 
These lessons were practiced later by Thai officials in December 1972, 
and Austrian authorities in December 1975 when OPEC ministers were 
kidnapped in Vienna. The same lessons have been applied in many other 
instances since 1972. However, it must be remembered that similar lessons 
were acquired and studied by terrorist groups and applied on different occasions 
in the years that followed. 
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